A Critique of Loan Targeting and What to Do After Overcoming the Habit by Adams, Dale W.
Studies in 
Rural Finance 
A Critique of Loan Targeting 
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper No. 2087 
and What to Do After Overcoming The Habit 
by 
Dale W Adams 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
The Ohio State University 
November 3, 1993 
Rural Finance Program 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Sociology 
The Ohio State University 
2120 Fyffe Road 
Columbus, Ohio 43210 
A CRITIQUE OF LOAN TARGETING 
AND WHAT TO DO AFTER OVERCOMING THE HABIT 
[Loan targeting has been a popular development tool, especially in 
centrally planned countries, for addressing poverty and to speed 
development. The results of these efforts, however, have often 
b~en disappointing. Three weaknesses of loan targeting are 
d1scussed and suggestions are also given on how financial markets 
might be better used after reforms have subjected most economic 
decisions in rural areas to market forces.] 
Numerous countries are reforming their rural economies by reducing the 
role of state enterprises and increasing the jurisdiction of market prices. 
Major adjustments in rural financial markets must accompany these reforms, 
including dismantling loan targeting. In the discussion that follows loan 
targeting is critiqued and then suggestions are presented on the role 
financial markets should play after reform. 
LOAN TARGETING 
Loan targeting prescribes the characteristics of people who are eligible 
for loans, dictates the enterprises eligible for credits, specifies inputs 
that may be purchased with loans, or mandates investments that may be made 
with credit. Loan targeting is the bread-and-butter of donor agencies, the 
instinctive reflex of political systems, and the warp-and-woof of financial 
markets in centrally planned economies. Its most attractive features are the 
feeling of control it furnishes policy makers and the ease of announcing and 
implementing such programs. Targeted loans are sometimes accompanied by 
subsidies, such as concessionary interest rates or casual loan recovery, that 
are intended to amplify the results of targeting. Credit need is a 
frequently-used phrase in discussions about loan plans and targets. 
Unfortunately, the popularity of loan targeting is not matched by 
effectiveness. Evidence increasingly shows that loan plans often fail to 
translate into planned changes in behavior by participants in financial 
markets, particularly those dealing with agriculture (Von Pischke). While 
loan targeting may affect behavior of financial market participants in urban 
areas, along with borrowers of large amounts, it is much less effective in 
rural areas because of distances from central control and the large number of 
individuals involved. A donor, for example, may target a loan to fund the 
installation of a large dam in Brazil and cause a dam to be erected that would 
not otherwise be built--the donor can insure a large measure of additionality. 
Control over the ultimate use of loans largely disappears, however, when the 
government targets fertilizer loans to thousands of farmers in a country such 
as Ghana through dozens of bank branches. The lending may result in virtually 
no additionality in the directions desired by the donor when credit is the 
main policy instrument employed. 
Loan targeting has at least three limitations: it attempts to substitute 
the supposed wisdom of the credit planner for that of loan officers and 
borrowers; it presupposes that borrowers and lenders can be forced to do 
things they would otherwise avoid; and it ignores the adverse effects 
targeting have on the operation of financial markets. 
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Wisdom of the planner 
Targeting presupposes that the wisdom of the planner is superior in two 
respects to that of loan officers and borrowers. The first is that planners 
recognize poverty--something that is ignored by participants in rural 
financial markets. The second is that planners have superior insights and are 
able to identify high return investments that rural lenders and borrowers 
overlook. 
While rural poverty merits government and donor attention, credit 
programs may not be the appropriate treatment for poverty. Any subsidy 
attached to a loan is always proportional to loan size: large loan large 
subsidy, small loan small subsidy, and no loan no subsidy. Since poor people 
receive only small loans or no loans, and relatively rich people have more 
access to loans in general--and especially to large loans--credit subsidies 
are always distributed regressively by financial markets. If policy makers 
attempt to subsidize only small loans the financial system has a double 
incentive to avoid lending to poor people; small loans are the most costly and 
yield the least revenue per unit of money lent. 
The wisdom of credit planners is more apparent than real. Research is 
increasingly showing that farms are heterogeneous and that rural households 
are mostly efficient in adjusting to their surroundings and responding to 
opportunities. If farmers have attractive economic opportunities they will 
find ways to make investments--witness the coca (cocaine) growers in Bolivia 
and Peru. An efficient and flexible financial system only assists some of 
these entrepreneurs to capitalize on opportunities more quickly than they 
would do otherwise. Too often loan targeting undermines the vitality and 
flexibility of the financial system and makes it less able to seek out and 
assist entrepreneurs with the highest return options. If the investment 
opportunities yield low returns, loans will not make these options attractive, 
regardless of the subsidies attached to borrowing. 
Loan officers and borrowers have more ability to decide on rural 
projects that merit loan funding than do credit planners in distant cities. 
Fungibility 
Most parents have experienced telling their children to do something, 
having them nod in agreement, and then finding later they have done something 
different. A similar divergence between promise and action occurs in 
financial markets because of the fundamental attribute of money, its 
fungibility or interchangeability. Borrowers are willing to agree to whatever 
loan purpose planners wish to assign, knowing full well that fungibility 
allows them to use borrowed funds for a variety of purposes. Instead of 
choosing the investment selected by the loan planner, borrowers ultimately 
select the most attractive option from among the array of alternatives open to 
them, including additional consumption. 
A credit-fertilizer example illustrates fungibility. Credit planners 
may decide in Manila, the Philippines th~t.all farmer~ throughout the.country 
who oroduce rice need four sacks of fert1l1zer per un1t of land, prov1de 
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targeted loans to facilitate this, and grant loans in kind to force loan-use 
compliance. Farmer-borrowers may feel, however, that four sacks of fertilizer 
are too much on their land, apply only half that amount, sell the remainder in 
a secondary market, and then spend the receipts from the sale on any activity 
they wishes. Only when the priorities of the credit planner and the borrower 
coincide is fungibility not exercised. If priorities coincide there is no 
need for loan targeting. 
Fungibility takes place at all levels of the financial system and within 
government budgets. Fungibility obviates the possibility of loan planners 
being able to micro-manage borrower decisions. Planners are self deluded into 
thinking they control loan allocation and use. What loan officers and 
borrowers do is often quite different from what credit planners anticipate. 
Targeting and performance of the financial system 
Loan targeting not only fails to work as intended, but it also weakens 
the financial system. Extensive loan targeting increases the transaction 
costs in financial markets, crowds out vital information with data that is 
useless for bank managers, discourages deposit mobilization, and exposes the 
financial system to political intrusions and corruption. This causes the 
formal financial system to service fewer people than it might do otherwise. 
Even worse, it undermines the bridges between surplus 
and deficit economic units in rural areas that otherwise would result in more 
efficient resource allocation. 
Extensive loan targeting turns the financial system into a fiscal 
mechanism that taxes and subsidizes. The addiction to loan targeting is a 
major reason for formal rural financial markets in many of the low income 
countries being debilitated in the 1990s. Basing loan decisions on the 
creditworthiness of the borrower and delegating most of the authority for 
extending credits to loan officers are the only ways of building durable and 
efficient financial systems. Policy makers and donors must look beyond the 
financial system--cheap credit and targeted loans--if they wish to help poor 
people and find ways of more directly prodding development. 
AFTER REFORM 
Fundamental economic reforms upset at least five comfortable 
relationships in rural financial markets: it forces the system to perform new 
roles; it alters the corporate culture of rural banks; it causes restructuring 
of the sources and uses of funds; it modifies information flows; and, most 
importantly, it broadens the client base (Patten and Rosengard}. 
New roles 
Contraction in loan targeting and subsidies usually accompany reform. 
Increasingly, loans are made on the basis of creditworthiness (the ability to 
repay} rather than on the basis of need. This results in much less use of 
credit to lead development efforts and to assist poor people, and much more 
emphasis on doing efficient financial intermediation. The financial system 
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becomes more ?f a follower of development rather than a leader. Prices of 
products and 1nputs, along with technological change, lead development in a 
market economy. 
This alteration in roles is accompanied by changes in criteria used to 
evaluate the performance of the financial system. Before reform, evaluations 
concentrate on what borrowers did with loans. Targeted credit programs are 
usually evaluated on the basis of number of loans made and extent to which 
lend~ng quotas are filled. Attempts may also be made to measure the impact of 
cred1t use at the borrower level. After reform more attention is paid to the 
well being of the financial system, to loan recovery performance, to deposit 
mobilization, to transactions costs, and also to the numbers of people who are 
served by the financial system, both borrowers and depositors. 
Corporate culture 
Before reform the financial system pays little attention to its products 
and services; in large part they are predetermined by those who set loan 
targets and who prepare loan plans. When farm products and inputs are hived 
off into private enterprises the rural financial system must alter existing 
financial services and create new ones. The financial system switches from 
being supply driven before reform to being demand driven after reform. 
Prior to reform rural banks may earn substantial profits from handling 
farm inputs or products, loan recovery is often assured because of the ties 
between credit and input or product sales, and many loans are made in kind. 
After reform the financial system must rely mostly on financial products and 
services for revenues, loan recovery becomes more problematic, and most loans 
are made in cash. 
To accommodate these changes, rural banks must become more service 
oriented than they typically were before reforms. Instead of a patronal 
relationship with their clients, rural banks, after reform, must treat their 
clients as valued customers. This includes developing new financial products 
such as deposit instruments, insurance, money transfer mechanisms, and 
flexible loan contracts. 
This change in corporate culture is accompanied by an alteration in the 
structure of financial institutions. Organizationally, the institutions must 
become flatter as they move away from loan planning to creditworthy lending. 
This involves delegating more authority for lending decisions to low levels of 
the financial system and less control and planning at the top. 
Sources and uses of funds 
Before reforms most of the loanable funds in rural financial markets are 
provided by donors, governments, or by commercial banks because of pressure 
placed on them to allot funds for rural lending, usually on concessionary 
terms. In many cases, a substantial part of the capital or equity funding for 
the rural financial system is also provided by government. Because most of 
the system is supported by government, there is little attention paid to 
questions of capital adequacy in rural banks. 
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Many of these.sourc7s of funds for rural lending disappear after reform 
and the money that 1s ava1lable usually carries much higher interest rates. 
This forces rural lenders to seek additional funds through mobilizing deposits 
and to also pay more attention to the overall costs of funds. Individuals and 
firms ~h~t w~sh to draw on these !unds for loans must compete by paying 
compet1t1ve 1nterest rates, offer1ng collateral that is acceptable to the 
lender, and also proving their creditworthiness. 
Information flows 
Before reform most of the information passing through the financial 
system responds to priorities of loan planners. The planners transmit 
information on loan quotas and targets to loan offices and later receive 
information back from lower echelons of the financial system on the extent to 
which loan targets were met. Targeting information often crowds out data that 
would be more useful to bank managers whose objectives are to operate 
efficient and durable financial institutions. Information is typically 
available on the number and amount of money dispensed in fertilizer loans, for 
example, while only cursory information is available on the status of loan 
recovery. 
After reform most of the loan targeting information disappears and is 
replaced by data that is more useful to those who tend the well-being of 
banks. This includes bank supervisors and examiners whose job is to protect 
depositors. It also includes bank managers who are increasingly judged on the 
basis of profits and losses. This forces managers to seek information on 
transaction costs, the costs and returns of various sub units and bank 
products, and to also carefully monitor loan recovery. Modern data processing 
equipment and skills are required to handle this timely information. 
New clients 
Seeking new clients is perhaps the most dramatic challenge that reform 
presents rural financial markets. Prior to reform rural banks largely ignored 
depositors as important sources of funds. After reform rural banks must 
solicit funds from depositors who typically are much more numerous than 
borrowers. Managing these deposits usually requires changes in data 
processing as banks are forced to handle many more transactions after reform 
than before. 
The privatization and separation of input and product marketing from the 
financial system also reconfigures the bank's portfolio of clients. Many of 
the new private agribusinesses should become clients of rural banks. At least 
some of the farmers who borrowed funds prior to reform may decide not to seek 
loans from banks after reforms; higher interest rates, the removal of 
subsidies, and the opportunity to buy and sell goods in private ~arkets will 
induce some previous borrowers to self finance. Also, some prev1ous bo~rowers 
will obtain loans through informal credit that expands with the growth 1n 
private marketing. 
Many merchants and farmers in virtually all countries find it in their 
best interests to offer and use informal credit. Merchants use informal loans 
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as a way of attracting clients and are able to efficiently screen creditworthy 
borrower~ beca~se of the information that i~ available to them through various 
transact1ons w1th borrowers. Farmers are l1kewise attracted to these 
arrangements because of modest transaction costs and the flexible loan 
contracts offered by traders and merchants. 
Reforms and changes in clients are a mixed blessing for rural banks. On 
the one hand, it is relatively easy for banks to deal with the newly emerging 
agribusiness who are often urban based, educated, have standard collateral, 
and request large loans. Historically, banks have been more eager to lend to 
a few traders and merchants than to large numbers of small farmers. On the 
other hand, reforms force banks to mobilize deposits and to become much more 
client oriented. Borrowers who must use targeted and subsidized loans to 
access modern farm inputs, for example, are willing to suffer low quality 
services from their lender because they have no choice. Savers have many 
alternative uses for their funds and will only deposit in a bank if services 
are attractive. Likewise, after reform, informal finance increasingly 
competes with banks for both loans and deposits. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The switch from lending based on need to lending based on 
creditworthiness is a major step for both banks and clients. Under targeting 
loans are viewed as entitlements that most people should receive, while after 
reform borrowing is viewed as a privilege that must be earned by proving 
creditworthiness. The primary problems in target-based lending are dispensing 
and recovering loans. Creditworthiness lending is a more complicated and 
diffused system where a major problem for the lender is to screen applicants 
for loans who are creditworthy from those who are not, and to also offer 
opportunities for individuals and firms to enhance their creditworthiness. 
From the individual or firm's perspective, the problem is to establish their 
creditworthiness with the lender. Acquiring creditworthiness takes time, 
patience and discipline. It is one of the most important characteristics that 
sorts successful from unsuccessful financial firms. Constructing a financial 
system that can perform these important tasks efficiently may be one the most 
difficult challenges faced in economies that were previously centrally 
planned. 
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